This paper studies the appropriative aspect of the struggle for survival. We assume that, if resources are scarce, then the probability of survival is low and the appropriation of additional resources has a large effect on the probability of survival. Consequently, resource scarcity causes people to allocate a large amount of time and effort to appropriative conflict. Also, anticipated future resource abundance increases the value attached to survival and, consequently, amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict. Interestingly, if resources are currently sufficiently scarce, then larger anticipated future abundance can cause people to allocate sufficiently more time and effort to appropriative conflict to result in a decrease in the sum of current and expected future utility, a "paradox of anticipated abundance".
The struggle for survival has been for most of history, and even today in many parts of the world continues to be, the first priority of human life. This struggle has pitted both man against nature in an effort to produce the necessities for survival and man against man in an effort to appropriate the resources from which these necessities are produced. This paper focuses on the appropriative aspect of the struggle for survival. Our analysis shows how both current resource scarcity and anticipated future resource abundance cause people to allocate time and effort to appropriative conflict.
In their fascinating account of the economic history of Easter Island, James A. Brander and M. Scott Taylor (1998) report evidence that, after population on the island had peaked sometime around 1400 A.D., the following century witnessed three forms of socioeconomic decline: Resource scarcity, attributable primarily to the depletion of the stock of coconut palms, resulted in decreasing food consumption. Engagement in the principal leisure activity, which was the carving and erecting of stone statues, also decreased. And, "the island entered a period of violent internecine conflict", with even "strong evidence of cannibalism". Brander and Taylor tell us that this evidence supports a historical interpretation that claims that "rather than being the cause of decline, violent conflict is commonly the result of resource degradation and occurs after the civilization has started to decline." Easter Island, of course, is not a unique example of resource scarcity causing appropriative conflict. James Tong (1988) provides convincing evidence that periodic subsistence crises caused recurring appropriative conflict, as well as cannibalism, in premodern China. Jack Goldstone (1991) blames the pressure of population on resources for the widespread revolts that plagued both the Ottoman Empire and the Ming dynasty in the first half of the seventeenth century. Brander and Taylor claim further that the idea that resource scarcity relative to population causes appropriative conflict is also applicable to modern history, and they offer recent events in Rwanda as an example. Renner (1996) provides a more complete account of the effect of increasing population pressure on agricultural land in causing conflict in Rwanda. Renner offers a similar analysis of ongoing conflict in the that resource scarcity causes appropriative conflict is a purely empirical hypothesis. These authors do not offer a theory of the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict.
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Nevertheless, even without a formal model, the hypothesis that resource scarcity causes a large allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict is surely a plausible theoretical conjecture. In the words of Jack Hirshleifer (1995) , "As Malthusian pressures depress per capita incomes, it comes to a choice between fighting and starving". Surprisingly, the hypothesis that resource scarcity causes a large allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict is not easy to formalize. It is natural to assume that both the return to time and effort allocated to appropriative conflict and the return to time and effort allocated to productive activities depend positively on the resource endowment. Consequently, if all time and effort is allocated either to appropriative conflict or to productive activities, then there is no presumption that resource scarcity affects the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict in one way or the other.
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Mexican state of Chiapas.
2 Brander and Taylor develop a theoretical model of the dynamic interaction between population and a resource stock, but their model addresses only the allocation of time and effort between resource harvesting and leisure activities. Furthermore, their assumptions imply that the fraction of the labor force allocated to harvesting is independent of the size of the resource stock. Hence, even if we were to interpret harvesting to be a metaphor for appropriative conflict, their model cannot rationalize the hypothesis that resource scarcity causes a large allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict. Tong asserts that his account of appropriative conflict in premodern China is consistent with a rational choice model, but he does not formalize such a model. Allowing for the allocation of time and effort to leisure activities, as an alternative to both appropriative conflict and productive activities, does not by itself resolve this ambiguity. The resource endowment has both a substitution effect and an income effect on the allocation of time to leisure, and in an atemporal context we have no reason to presume that one effect or the other is dominant.
In the present paper we extend the analysis not only to allow for leisure activities, but also to consider explicitly the effect of consumption on the probability of survival. We assume that, if resources are scarce, then the probability of survival is low, and the appropriation of additional resources has a large effect on the probability of survival. The introduction of this intertemporal dimension enables us to formalize the "choice between fighting and starving".
Our model implies that resource scarcity causes people to allocate a large amount of time and effort to appropriative conflict, that anticipated future resource abundance amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict, and that resource scarcity creates the possibility of a "paradox of anticipated abundance". Our model is generic in that it abstracts from political and economic institutions.
An Endowment Economy
Consider a large population of n + 1 identical people that receives in each period a positive nonstorable endowment of productive resources. The size of the endowment received in the current period is (n + 1)E units, where E ≥ 1. This endowment is initially in a common pool over which the people engage in appropriative conflict.
4 The analysis takes the decisiveness parameter. In Herschel Grossman (1992) and in Kai Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas (1998) the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict is positively, rather than negatively, related to the value of the appropriable endowment, which in Grossman is foreign aid and in Konrad and Skaperdas is a shopkeeper's rents, because these models assume that the alternative cost of time and effort allocated to appropriative conflict is independent of the value of the appropriable endowment.
the size of the endowment and the population as given. Our objective is to understand how the current and anticipated future size of the endowment affects the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict.
To model the outcome of the appropriative conflict we specify a standard "contest-success function", according to which a person appropriates e units of resources, where
(1) e = r r + nR (n + 1)E.
In equation (1) r is the non-negative fraction of his time and effort that this person allocates to appropriative conflict, and R is the fraction of time and effort that other people on average allocate to appropriative conflict. The important properties of equation (1) are that e is an increasing concave function of the ratio r/R and that a person who allocates the same fraction of time and effort to appropriative conflict as the average person appropriates the average endowment, E. Also, e is bounded between zero and (n + 1)E, the entire endowment.
As is also standard, we assume that a person maximizes the sum of his current utility and his expected future utility, and that he obtains current utility from both his current consumption and his current leisure activity. Abstractly from pure time discounting, we specify the maximand, denoted by u, as
In equation (2) a person currently consumes c units of consumables, currently allocates the fraction h of his time and effort to leisure activities, survives to the next period with probability s, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, and attaches the value v to survival and the value x to death.
The sum α ln(c) + γh represents current utility, and the sum sv + (1 − s)x represents expected future utility. The assumption that the parameter γ is larger than the parameter α allows the possibility that in a steady state a person allocates a positive fraction of his time and effort to leisure activities. 6 We treat x, which presumably is negative, as a parameter.
Assume for now that a person effortlessly converts his e units of resources into e units of consumables and that consumables are nonstorable and inalienable, so that c equals e. Given that production is effortless, any time and effort not allocated to appropriative conflict is available for leisure activity. Thus, h is equal to 1 − r. [Below we extend the analysis to allow for a nontrivial production technology according to which time and effort is required to convert resources into consumables.]
The logarithmic function in equation (2) implies that, for a given value of expected future to allow appropriative conflict to use up or to destroy some of the resource endowment or even, as noted below, to cause the death of some of the participants. Another interesting extension of the analysis would be to allow for differences among individuals in their abilities to appropriate resources.
6 Although we follow Brander and Taylor in assuming that leisure activities use only time and effort, Jared Diamond (1992) tells us that the carving and erecting of stone statues on Easter Island also used productive resources, which were the tree trunks used to roll the statues from the quarries to their platforms and to erect them. With this more complex technology the effect of resource scarcity on the allocation of time and effort to appropriative activities would be amplified.
utility, the substitution effect and the income effect of a person's resources on his allocation of time and effort between appropriative conflict and leisure activities are exactly offsetting.
In this model the dependence of the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict on the resource endowment does not assume that one of these effects is dominant.
The innovative feature of our analysis is the incorporation of the positive effect of consumption on the probability of survival. 7 Specifically, we consider an economy in which, in the range of relevant consumption possibilities, a person's survival probability depends on his consumption according to
where q(c) = 0, q (c) > 0, q (c) < 0, lim c→c q (c) = ∞, and c > 1. We also assume that the product q (c) c is a decreasing function of c.
In equation (3) 9 Also, as c approaches c from above, the derivative of s with respect to c becomes infinitely large. The assumption that the 7 As noted above, appropriative conflict can be nonviolent or violent. Dan Usher (1992, Chapter III) suggests a model of violent appropriative conflict in which the probability of survival depends positively on the level of consumption and, also, negatively on the amount of time and effort that people allocate to appropriative conflict. Adding such a dependence to our model would decrease the equilibrium amount of time and effort allocated to appropriative conflict.
8 The individual consumption level c is distinct from the Malthusian concept of subsistence consumption, which Malthus defined in his analysis of population growth to be the average level of consumption at which the death rate equals the birth rate.
9 The assumption that the probability of survival is an increasing function of homogeneous consumption seems appropriate for an economy in which people are engaged in the struggle for survival. In modelling a more affluent economy we might want to distinguish the consumption of necessities, defined as an activity product q (c) c is a decreasing function of c, which is important for our results, implies that the absolute value of the elasticity of q (c) with respect to c, defined as −c q (c)/q (c), is larger than one.
Allocation of Time and Effort
A person takes E, R, and v as given and allocates his time and effort between r and h to maximize the sum of his current utility and his expected future utility, as given by equation (2), subject to equations (1) where, assuming that c is larger than c,
and where from equation (1) we have dc dr = nR (r + nR) 2 (n + 1) E.
These first-order conditions imply a unique, symmetrical equilibrium in which every person makes the same choices of r and h. In such an equilibrium we have for every person r = R and, hence, from equation (1), e = E. Accordingly, in equilibrium we have c = E, and equation (5) becomes
that increases the probability of survival, from the consumption of luxuries, defined as an activity that increases current utility but does not increase the probability of survival.
For large values of n equation (6) becomes in the limit
Solving equations (4.1), (4.2), and (7) for R yields
Equation (8) shows that in this model, if the survival probability did not depend on consumption, then the amount of time and effort allocated to appropriative conflict, R,
would not depend on the current per capita resource endowment, E. Specifically, if q (c)
were zero, then R would equal α/γ for all values of E. More importantly, given that q (c) is positive, equation (8) implies that R depends both on E and on the value v that a person attaches to survival. Holding E fixed, R is positively related to v. Holding v fixed, the relation between E and R involves the product of two factors, q (E) and E.
The factor q (E) enters because the marginal effect of a person's consumption on his probability of survival is a decreasing function of his consumption. The factor E enters because the marginal effect of the time and effort that a person allocates to appropriative conflict on the units of resources that he appropriates is an increasing function of the average endowment. The assumption that the product q (c) c is a decreasing function of c implies that the first factor dominates the second factor. Thus, holding v fixed, R is negatively related to E. Equation (8) also implies that R equals one for values of E and v such that
Given that γ is larger than α, condition (9) is satisfied for combinations of sufficiently small values of E and sufficiently large values of v.
Transitory Resource Scarcity
Using equation (8) and condition (9) consider the effect of transitory resource scarcity on the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict. Transitory resource scarcity means that the current per capita resource endowment, E, is smaller than the permanent per capita resource endowment and hence, that current consumption is smaller than future consumption possibilities. Because transitory resource scarcity does not affect future consumption, transitory resource scarcity does not affect the value v that a person attaches to survival.
We have just seen in equation (8) that, holding v fixed, R is negatively related to E.
Thus, equation (8) implies that transitory resource scarcity causes a temporary increase in the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict. In fact, condition (9) implies that a small enough transitory realization of E causes people to allocate all of their current time and effort to appropriative conflict, thereby forgoing current leisure activities entirely. These results obtain because the dominant effect of transitory resource scarcity is to increase the current marginal effect of consumption on the probability of survival.
Anticipated Future Resource Abundance
Again using equation (8) and condition (9) consider the effect of anticipated future resource abundance on the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict.
Larger future resource abundance would imply larger future consumption and, hence, would cause people to attach a larger value v to survival.
We have seen in equation (8) that, holding E fixed, R is positively related to v.
Thus, equation (8) implies that larger anticipated future resource abundance causes people currently to allocate more time and effort to appropriative conflict. In this respect, the effect of larger anticipated future resource abundance is similar to the effect of transitory resource scarcity. In fact, condition (9) implies that, given E, a large enough value of v causes people to allocate all of their current time and effort to appropriative conflict, thereby forgoing current leisure activities entirely.
The effect of larger anticipated future resource abundance in causing people to allocate more time and effort to appropriative conflict creates the possibility of a "paradox of anticipated abundance", by which we mean a negative effect of anticipated future resource abundance on the sum of current and expected future utility. Using equations (2) and (8) we calculate that, for R < 1,
Given that the product q (c) c is a decreasing function of c, that q(c) is an increasing function of c, and that q(c) = 0, equation (10) implies that du/dv is negative for small enough values of E and that du/dv is positive for large enough values of E.
These results say that, if resources are currently sufficiently abundant, then larger anticipated future resource abundance increases the sum of current and expected future utility.
But, if resources are currently sufficiently scarce, then larger anticipated future resource abundance decreases the sum of current and expected future utility. With current resource scarcity a paradox of anticipated abundance occurs because the current marginal effect of consumption on the probability of survival is large, and, hence, larger anticipated future resource abundance causes a large increase in the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict.
Appropriative Conflict in a Steady State
Finally, consider the effect of the resource endowment on the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict in a steady state in which the per capita resource endowment, E, is constant over time. Observe that in such a steady state the value, v, that a person attaches to survival equals the sum of his current utility and his expected future utility, u.
Equating v and u, equation (2) implies that in a steady state
Solving equations (8) and (11) together for v and u, we obtain
Given that the product q (c) c is a decreasing function of c and that q(c) is an increasing function of c, the denominators of both of the fractions in equation (12) are negatively related to E. Thus, equation (12) implies that in a steady state v and u are positively related to E for all values of E. This result says that, although a larger resource endowment can cause people to allocate more time and effort to appropriative conflict, in a steady state the direct positive effect of abundance on consumption would outweigh this indirect negative effect. This result precludes a "paradox of abundance" in a steady state.
Because v is positively related to E, we see from equation (8) that in the steady state the direction of the effect of E on R depends on the net of the negative effect of E on the product q (E) E and the positive effect of E on the difference v − x. Solving equations (8) and (11) together for R, we obtain
Equation (13) implies that in a steady state R equals one for values of E such that
Given that c > 1 and that lim c→c q (c) = ∞, condition (14) is satisfied for sufficiently small permanent values of E -that is, for permanent values of E sufficiently close to c. Conversely, if γ is sufficiently large relative to α, then condition (14) is violated for permanent values of E that are not too small. In other words, condition (14) implies that in a steady state, if resources are sufficiently scarce, then people allocate all of their time and effort to appropriative conflict. But, if the utility derived from leisure activities is sufficiently large relative to the utility derived from consumption, and if resources are not extremely scarce, then in a steady state people allocate some of their time and effort to leisure activities rather than to appropriative conflict.
A Production Economy
This section extends the analysis to allow for the allocation of time and effort to production. Specifically, in place of c = e, assume that the conversion of resources into consumables involves a Cobb-Douglas technology, c = l β e 1−β , 0 < β < 1, where l is the non-negative fraction of his time and effort that a person allocates to the production of consumables. Now, instead of h = 1 − r, we have h = 1 − l − r. In the limit as β approaches zero, the analysis that follows becomes identical to the analysis in the preceding sections.
A person again takes R and E as given and now chooses r, l, and h to maximize the sum of his current utility and his expected future utility as given by equation (2), subject to equations (1) where, assuming that c is larger than c,
and where, from equation (1) and c = l β e 1−β , we have ∂c ∂r = (1 − β) (l/e) β nR (r + nR) 2 (n + 1) E, and ∂c ∂l = β (e/l) 1−β .
These first-order conditions imply again a unique, symmetrical equilibrium in which every person makes the same choices. In such an equilibrium we have for every person r = R and, hence, from equation (1), e = E, and also l = L, where L is the fraction of time and effort that people on average allocate to the production of consumables. Accordingly, in equilibrium, we have c = L β E 1−β , and for large values of n equations (16) and (17) become in the limit
Equations (15.1), (15.2), (18) and (19) together imply the equilibrium conditions
Equation (21) is identical to equation (8) above, except for the factor 1 − β in equation (21) and for the fact that c, which equals L β E 1−β , appears in equation (21) we obtain the same qualitative implications for the relations between R, E, and v as we did from equation (8) and from equation (8) and equation (11) together. The main new implication from extending the analysis to allow for a nontrivial production technology is that time and effort allocated to appropriative conflict over the resource endowment and time and effort allocated to producing consumables from the resources are complementary alternatives to the allocation of time and effort to leisure activities.
Summary
This paper has studied the appropriative aspect of the struggle for survival, the "choice between fighting and starving". Appropriative conflict is a prime example of an activity whose private return is positive, but whose social return is zero. We assumed that, if resources are scarce, then the probability of survival is low and the appropriation of additional resources has a large effect on the probability of survival. Consequently, resource scarcity causes people to allocate a large amount of time and effort to appropriative conflict.
This effect obtains whether resource scarcity is transitory or permanent, but the effect is larger if resource scarcity is transitory. Also, anticipated future resource abundance increases the value attached to survival and, consequently, amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict. In this way the current struggle for survival dissipates the expected future utility associated with anticipated future resource abundance. If, in fact, resources are currently sufficiently scarce, and, accordingly, the current marginal effect of consumption on the probability of survival is sufficiently large, then larger anticipated future abundance can cause people to allocate sufficiently more time and effort to appropriative conflict to result in a decrease in the sum of current and expected future utility, a "paradox of anticipated abundance".
